Veri cation plays a central role in the security of Java bytecode: the Java bytecode veri er performs a static analysis to ensure that bytecode loaded over a network has certain security related properties. When this is the case, the bytecode can be e ciently interpreted without runtime security checks.
Motivation
Veri cation plays a central role in the security of Java bytecode: the Java bytecode veri er performs a static analysis to ensure that bytecode loaded over a network has certain security related properties. When this is the case, the bytecode can be e ciently interpreted without runtime security checks.
Our research concerns the theoretical foundations of bytecode veri cation and alternative approaches to specifying and checking security properties. This is important as currently the \security policy" for Java bytecode is given informally by a natural language document LY96] and the bytecode veri er itself is a closed system (part of the Java virtual machine). We believe that there are advantages to more formal approaches to security. A formal approach can disambiguate the current policy and provide a basis for veri cation tools. It can also help expose bugs or weaknesses that can corrupt Java security MF97]. Moreover, when the formal speci cation is realized in a logic and veri cation is based on a theorem prover, extensions become possible such as integrating the veri cation of security properties with other kinds of veri cation, e.g., proof-carrying code NL96,NL98].
Approach
We provide a formal foundation to bytecode veri cation based on model checking. The idea, which has similarities with data ow analysis and abstract inter- nitely many types appears in each method, the resulting abstraction M n is nite; the size of the state-space is exponential in the number of local variables and the maximal stack height.
After we can apply a model checker to M n . The properties that we model check correspond to the type safety checks performed by the Java bytecode veri er. For example, we specify that each transition in M n that represents a machine instruction in M nds appropriately typed data in the locations (stack or local variables) it uses. The model checker then either responds that the byte code is secure (with respect to these properties) or provides a counter-example to its security.
Architectural Description
The overall structure of our system is depicted in Figure 1 . As input it takes a Java class le as well as a speci cation of an abstraction of the Java virtual machine. The speci cation de nes the states of the abstract machine and how For each instruction, a precondition to its execution is given (e.g. that the operand-stack must contain enough operands of appropriate type) and also invariants are stated (e.g. that the stack may not exceed its maximal size). These are the properties that are model checked.
The core routine (method abstraction) translates bytecode into a nite state transition system using the speci cation of the abstract machine. Separating the machine speci cation from the translation gives us a modular system where we can easily change the virtual machine and the properties checked. Our system is also modular with respect to the model checker used. Currently we have implemented two di erent back-ends: one that compiles the transition system and properties to the input language of the SMV model checker and a second that generates output in the SPIN language Promela.
Example Output
As a simple example (even here we must elide details) we give (a) a Java program, (b) the corresponding bytecode, and (c) the output of our system, which is input for the SPIN model checker. The Java program and the bytecode should be clear. We have added by hand some comments to (c). In the process meth fac, the transitions of the method fac are modeled. For example, the rst instruction of the method iload0 loads an integer value from a local variable on the stack; the corresponding condition to be checked (cond 1) requires that the respective variable contains an integer value. The instruction ifne performs a conditional branch, which is modeled by nondeterministically assigning a new value to the program counter. The process asrt fac runs in parallel to the process meth fac and checks if all conditions (preconditions and invariants) are ful lled. SPIN checks this in negligible time (0.03 seconds).
Future Work
We have completed Version 1 of the system. This formalizes and model-checks the JavaCard subset of Java, which is used for smartcards Sun98]. We have chosen this particular instance of Java for three reasons: rst, JavaCard does not allow for dynamic class loading, therefore there are no \real-time" requirements for bytecode veri cation. Second, the bytecode veri er for JavaCard lives outside the client platform, so it can easily be replaced/extended without modifying the platform itself. Finally, our aproach can contribute to meeting the high security requirements that smartcard applications usually have.
In a future release we plan to extend this version to the full JVM instruction set. The only signi cant problems that might occur are run time requirements for the model checker (de ned by the time a user is willing to wait when loading a class) and multi-threading, which is not possible in JavaCard and could increase the model checker's search space.
